Commitment to Correlated Strategies

The standard approach to computing an optimal mixed strategy to commit to is based on solving a set of linear programs, one for each of the follower's pure strategies. We show that these linear programs can be naturally merged into a single linear program; that this linear program can be interpreted as a formulation for the optimal correlated strategy to commit to, giving an easy proof of a result by von Stengel and Zamir that the leader's utility is at least the utility she gets in any correlated equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game; and that this linear program can be extended to compute optimal correlated strategies to commit to in games of three or more players. (Unlike in two-player games, in games of three or more players, the notions of optimal mixed and correlated strategies to commit to are truly distinct.) We give examples, and provide experimental results that indicate that for 50 × 50 games, this approach is usually significantly faster than the multiple-LPs approach.

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