论文信息 - The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games - 字舞流文

The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games

Abstract. We show that the nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games, and that this lack of monotonicity holds even if there are as few as four agents.

Toru Hokari | Toru Hokari

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