Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition government, and ideology

Abstract This paper investigates the relation between tax mimicking and electoral accountability against the background of data on Spain. The results confirm the presence of tax-mimicking behaviour and indicate a relation between tax mimicking and electoral accountability. Tax rates are found to be higher and the reaction to neighbours' tax rates lower when the electoral margin is high and when left-wing parties control government. Coalition governments do not tax heavily and mimic more than single party majority governments.

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