The ethical implications of the straight-commission compensation system — An agency perspective

This paper examines the role of the straight-commissioned salesperson in the context of agency theory and asserts that because the agent acts to benefit two principals, potential conflicts of interest arise. Temporal differences in receipt of rewards create a major conflict, while the firm's exhibition of both espoused and actual behaviors and information asymmetries intensify this conflict. Finally, in light of these inconsistencies, the ethical implications of the straight-commission compensation system are examined.

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