Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions

This article reviews the recent literature on regulation under asymmetric information. We first develop the conceptual framework and offer a reminder of the techniques used in the field. Then we apply the framework and techniques to a variety of situations -- with or without commitment. We conclude with a discussion of desirable directions for research.

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