Weighted multiple majority games with unions: Generating functions and applications to the European Union

An a priori system of unions or coalition structure is a partition of a finite set of players into disjoint coalitions which have made a prior commitment to cooperate in playing a game. This paper provides "ready-to-apply" procedures based on generating functions that are easily implementable to compute coalitional power indices in weighted multiple majority games. As an application of the proposed procedures, we calculate and compare coalitional power indices under the decision rules prescribed by the Treaty of Nice and the new rules proposed by the Council of the European Union.

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