The risks of military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) being subjected to electronic attack are well recognised, especially following high-profile incidents such as the interception of unencrypted video feeds from UAVs in Iraq and Israel, or the diversion and downing of a UAV in Iran. Protection of military UAV assets rightly focuses on defence against sophisticated cyber penetration or electronic attack, including data link intercepts and navigational spoofing. Offensive activity to counter adversary drone operations presumes a requirement for high-end electronic attack systems. However, combat operations in eastern Ukraine in 2014-16 have introduced an entirely new dimension to UAV and counter-UAV operations. In addition to drones with military-grade standards of electronic defence and encryption, a large number of civilian or amateur UAVs are in operation in the conflict. This presents both opportunities and challenges to future operations combating hybrid threats. Actual operations in eastern Ukraine, in combination with studies of potential criminal or terrorist use of UAV technologies, provide indicators for a range of aspects of UAV use in future conflict. However, apart from the direct link to military usage, UAVs are rapidly approaching ubiquity with a wide range of applications reaching from entertainment purposes to border patrol, surveillance, and research, which imposes an indirect security and safety threat. Issues associated with the unguarded use of drones by the general public range from potentially highly dangerous situations such as failing to avoid controlled airspace, to privacy violations. Specific questions include attribution of UAV activities to the individuals actually directing the drone; technical countermeasures against hacking, interception or electronic attack; and options for controlling and directing adversary UAVs. Lack of attribution and security measures protecting civilian UAVs against electronic attack, hacking or hijacking, with the consequent likelihood of unauthorised use or interception, greatly increases the complication of each of these concerns.
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