Introduction: Is there an after, after 9/11?

Since the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent responses to them scholars have charted and debated how those attacks altered our understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism and the world in which those behaviors occur. It is widely acknowledged that not only were there were great changes in the perception of the threat to the United States (both within the United States at the public and policy-making level) but also by states, publics and terrorists themselves. In addition, after the initiation of the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with the participation as well of NATO and others and the subsequent attacks in Western Europe beginning on 11 March 2003 and then 7/7 2005 and continuing almost to the present that feeling of vulnerability and confirmation that the hope of the post-cold war world had generated dissipated. Violence, radicalization and extremism, al Qaeda, ISIS and other terrorist groups have risen and fallen and western states today do not live facing an existential threat from terrorism (if, indeed, ever they did). However, somehow, for much of the general public and many policymakers, no transition from the immediacy of 9/11 has yet occurred. They continue to live in the same post-9/11 world. And thus, the articles assembled in this special section interrogate the important question: “Is there an After, After 9/11?” They do so from a number of distinct disciplinary and methodological perspectives, examining historical continuities and discontinuities, changes in counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation programs, media framing of extremism and radicalisation and the discourse on terrorism and counterterrorism of US Presidents. Leading off the special section, Michael Stohl argues that the declarations in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 that 9/11 “changed everything” also implied that the changes were inevitable. One important component of the explanation for the immutable nature of that belief was the failure to acknowledge that many of the decisions that were undertaken in the immediate aftermath of the attacks were not the only possible reactions. The “War on Terror,” the Patriot Act, the War in Afghanistan and later the War in Iraq were all assertive choices – not automatic or necessary options. Examining the decisions that were taken and the continuities across administrations, Stohl asks if it is now reasonable to ask if there is an opportunity to think that there may be an after, after 9/11. Next, Richard English posits that deeper recognition that the level of actual threat from terrorism to most western states remained (and remains) very low and that actually containing that threat (learning to live with it, avoiding over-militarisation, identifying and addressing root causes, working within established legal frameworks, prioritising