Optimal Crowds Contest Model for Crowdsourcing

With the increasing frequency of participation in social networking activities, tremendous value has been created by crowds. Thus some emerging industries come along with it to collect these values. At the same time, crowds require some compensation from the these project organizers for their privacy loss or cost of activities. This paper dedicate to exploit a users incentives system, it develops a game-theoretic model of crowdsourcing or crowdsensing services base on contests. The model consists of two parts: incentives and optimizing pricing. We start from the crowds' point of view, committed to dig out their equilibrium strategies. Based on this, a bonus pool and expected rewards are demonstrated for the organizer and crowds respectively.

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