Sequential contributions to public goods

[1]  Jeffry H. Galper Private pensions and public policy , 1973 .

[2]  J. Buchanan The Samaritan's Dilemma , 1975 .

[3]  T. Groves,et al.  Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the 'Free Rider Problem' , 1977 .

[4]  J. Guttman,et al.  Understanding Collective Action: Matching Behavior , 1978 .

[5]  T. Groves,et al.  Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible , 1979 .

[6]  L. Hurwicz Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points , 1979 .

[7]  Mark A Walker,et al.  A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations , 1981 .

[8]  Peter Warr,et al.  The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income , 1983 .

[9]  H. Varian,et al.  On the private provision of public goods , 1986 .

[10]  J. Guttman Matching behavior and collective action: Some experimental evidence , 1986 .

[11]  J. Guttman A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action , 1987 .

[12]  R. Roberts Financing Public Goods , 1987, Journal of Political Economy.

[13]  J. Weibull,et al.  Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.

[14]  T. Bergstrom Love and Spaghetti, The Opportunity Cost of Virtue , 1989 .

[15]  Anat R. Admati,et al.  Joint Projects without Commitment , 1991 .

[16]  L. Danziger,et al.  Implementing the Lindahl voluntary-exchange mechanism , 1991 .

[17]  Matthew O. Jackson,et al.  Implementing a public project and distributing its cost , 1992 .

[18]  H. Varian A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed , 1994 .

[19]  J. Ledyard Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research , 1994 .

[20]  R. Cornes,et al.  The theory of externalities, public goods and club goods. 2nd. ed. , 1996 .