论文信息 - The Econometrics and Some Properties of Separable Matching Models

The Econometrics and Some Properties of Separable Matching Models

We present a class of one-to-one matching models with perfectly transferable utility. We discuss identification and inference in these separable models, and we show how their comparative statics are readily analyzed.

Alfred Galichon | Bernard Salanié

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