The attack and defense of weakest-link networks

We experimentally test the qualitatively different equilibrium predictions of two theoretical models of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets. In such a network, the attacker’s objective is to assault at least one target successfully and the defender’s objective is to defend all targets. The models differ in how the conflict at each target is modeled—specifically, the lottery and auction contest success functions (CSFs). Consistent with equilibrium in the auction CSF model, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerrilla-warfare” strategy, which involves attacking at most one target arbitrarily with a random level of force. Inconsistent with equilibrium in the lottery CSF model, attackers use the “guerrilla-warfare” strategy and assault only one target instead of the equilibrium “complete-coverage” strategy that attacks all targets. Consistent with equilibrium in both models, as the attacker’s valuation increases, the average resource expenditure, the probability of winning, and the average payoff increase (decrease) for the attacker (defender).

[1]  Kjell Hausken Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems , 2008, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[2]  J. Vickers,et al.  Racing with Uncertainty , 1987 .

[3]  T. Sandler,et al.  An economic perspective on transnational terrorism , 2004 .

[4]  Dmitriy Kvasov,et al.  Contests with limited resources , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.

[5]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege , 2010 .

[6]  Anna Sjögren,et al.  Childcare costs and the demand for children—evidence from a nationwide reform , 2010 .

[7]  J. Hirshleifer From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods , 1983 .

[8]  Casper G. de Vries,et al.  An experimental examination of rational rent-seeking , 1998 .

[9]  Raul Caruso,et al.  The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict , 2012 .

[10]  Matthias Dahm,et al.  Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result , 2010 .

[11]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic Versus Psychological Momentum , 2012 .

[12]  R. Tollison,et al.  Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society , 1982 .

[13]  Arad Ayala,et al.  The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study , 2012 .

[14]  Aniol Llorente-Saguer,et al.  A Simple Mechanism for Resolving Conflict , 2008, Games Econ. Behav..

[15]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation , 2009 .

[16]  Walter Enders,et al.  Terrorism: An Empirical Analysis , 2007 .

[17]  Shengle Lin,et al.  Gradual Information Diffusion and Asset Price Momentum , 2010 .

[18]  Dan Kovenock,et al.  Multi-Battle Contests , 2006, Games Econ. Behav..

[19]  Wallace P. Mullin,et al.  Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Economics Working Paper Series Diversity, Social Goods Provision, and Performance in the Firm Diversity, Social Goods Provision, and Performance in the Firm , 2022 .

[20]  B. Roberson The Colonel Blotto game , 2006 .

[21]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests? , 2009 .

[22]  Roman M. Sheremeta Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests , 2010 .

[23]  Jørgen Juel Andersen,et al.  Voting When the Stakes are High , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[24]  Dan Kovenock,et al.  The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when R > 2 : Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates * , 2022 .

[25]  Klaus Abberger,et al.  The IFO Business Cycle Clock: Circular Correlation with the Real GDP , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[26]  Robert J. Reilly,et al.  Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer , 1998 .

[27]  Marco Scarsini,et al.  A Colonel Blotto Gladiator Game , 2012, Math. Oper. Res..

[28]  Michael Hoel,et al.  Is There a Green Paradox? , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[29]  V. Crawford,et al.  The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures , 2008 .

[30]  Armin Falk,et al.  Did We Overestimate the Role of Social Preferences? The Case of Self-Selected Student Samples , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[31]  Derek J. Clark,et al.  Asymmetric Conflict , 2007 .

[32]  Sandra Eickmeier,et al.  Macroeconomic Factors and Micro-Level Bank Risk , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[33]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  Endowment Effects in Contests , 2009 .

[34]  Fabian J Theis,et al.  Which Sectors of a Modern Economy are Most Central? , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[35]  Michael Binder,et al.  On the Conditional Effects of IMF Program Participation on Output Growth , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[36]  Ross J. Anderson,et al.  The Economics of Online Crime , 2009 .

[37]  M. Kremer,et al.  The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development , 1993 .

[38]  G. Tullock Efficient Rent Seeking , 2001 .

[39]  Roman M. Sheremeta Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests , 2009, Games Econ. Behav..

[40]  Aniol Llorente-Saguer,et al.  Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games , 2012, Int. J. Game Theory.

[41]  Andreas Wagener,et al.  Inefficient Group Organization as Optimal Adaptation to Dominant Environments , 2010 .

[42]  Thomas Lange,et al.  A Note on Brain Gain and Brain Drain: Permanent Migration and Education Policy , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[43]  Marco Runkel,et al.  Subsidizing Renewable Energy Under Capital Mobility , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[44]  A. Roth Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining , 1987 .

[45]  Wendy Carlin,et al.  Good Institutions Are Not Enough: Ongoing Challenges of East German Development , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[46]  Daniel Houser,et al.  High Stakes Behavior with Low Payoffs: Inducing Preferences with Holt-Laury Gambles , 2009 .

[47]  Jonathan Weinstein,et al.  Two Notes on the Blotto Game , 2012 .

[48]  Nikolaus Wolf,et al.  Europe's Great Depression: Coordination Failure after the First World War , 2010 .

[49]  É. Borel The Theory of Play and Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernels , 1953 .

[50]  S. Carson,et al.  Nineteenth Century US African-American and White Female Statures: Insight from US Prison Records , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[51]  John Dickhaut,et al.  Does information transparency decrease coordination failure? , 2010, Games Econ. Behav..

[52]  Konstantinos Angelopoulos,et al.  Fear of Model Misspecification and the Robustness Premium , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[53]  Jean-François Laslier,et al.  How two-party competition treats minorities , 2002 .

[54]  Yaakov Kareev,et al.  Do the Weak Stand a Chance? Distribution of Resources in a Competitive Environment , 2009, Cogn. Sci..

[55]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  Simultaneous Decision‐Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments , 2012 .

[56]  Yosef Mealem,et al.  Political Culture and Discrimination in Contests , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[57]  A. Kemnitz,et al.  Educational Federalism and the Quality Effects of Tuition Fees , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[58]  Robert Powell,et al.  Allocating Defensive Resources with Private Information about Vulnerability , 2007, American Political Science Review.

[59]  U. Fischbacher z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments , 1999 .

[60]  John Whalley,et al.  The Rapidly Deepening India-China Economic Relationship , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[61]  Paolo Manasse,et al.  The Twin Effects of Globalization - Evidence from a Sample of Indian Manufacturing Firms , 2010 .

[62]  Bart J. Wilson,et al.  Anarchy, groups, and conflict: an experiment on the emergence of protective associations , 2012, Soc. Choice Welf..

[63]  John Cadigan,et al.  Strategic entry deterrence and terrorism: Theory and experimental evidence , 2010 .

[64]  R. Powell Defending against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources , 2007, American Political Science Review.

[65]  Scott E. Page,et al.  General Blotto: games of allocative strategic mismatch , 2009 .

[66]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  Package Auctions and Exchanges , 2007 .

[67]  Dan Kovenock,et al.  Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[68]  Larry Samuelson,et al.  Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation Against an Unknown Attacker , 2005 .

[69]  Timothy N. Cason,et al.  Communication and Efficiency in Competitive Coordination Games , 2010, Games Econ. Behav..

[70]  Ariel Rubinstein,et al.  Colonel Blotto’s Top Secret Files , 2010 .

[71]  Miguel A. Fonseca An experimental investigation of asymmetric contests , 2009 .

[72]  Henricus Emerence David Houba Game theoretic models of bargaining , 1994 .

[73]  Jacob K. Goeree,et al.  Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[74]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests? , 2009, Soc. Choice Welf..

[75]  P. Graves,et al.  Appropriate Fiscal Policy Over the Business Cycle: Proper Stimulus Policies Can Work , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[76]  B. Roberson,et al.  The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game , 2008, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[77]  Rann Smorodinsky,et al.  All-Pay Auctions - An Experimental Study , 2006 .

[78]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games , 2009, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[79]  J. Boyd,et al.  Bank Competition, Asset Allocations and Risk of Failure: An Empirical Investigation , 2010 .

[80]  R. McKelvey,et al.  Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games , 1995 .

[81]  Roman M. Sheremeta,et al.  A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments , 2012, Experimental Economics.

[82]  Geir B. Asheim,et al.  Justifying Social Discounting: The Rank-Discounted Utilitarian Approach , 2010, J. Econ. Theory.

[83]  Justin Wolfers,et al.  Subjective Well-Being, Income, Economic Development and Growth , 2010 .

[84]  Marcus Dittrich,et al.  Union Membership and Employment Dynamics: A Note , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[85]  Fangzhen Lin,et al.  Designing competitions between teams of individuals , 2010, Artif. Intell..

[86]  Peter Zweifel,et al.  Is the Welfare State Sustainable? Experimental Evidence on Citizens' Preferences for Redistribution , 2010 .

[87]  Cary Deck,et al.  Fight or Flight? , 2010 .

[88]  Thomas Aronsson,et al.  The Standard Deviation of Life-Length, Retirement Incentives, and Optimal Pension Design , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[89]  Weidener Diskussionspapiere A Micro Data Approach to the Identification of Credit Crunches , 2010 .

[90]  Dan Kovenock,et al.  STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND ATTACK FOR SERIES AND PARALLEL RELIABILITY SYSTEMS: COMMENT , 2012 .

[91]  Dimitrios Nikolaou Koumparoulis Public capital, employment and productivity: An empirical investigation for Greece , 2010 .

[92]  Thomas Steger,et al.  History, Expectations, and Public Policy: Economic Development in Eastern Germany , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[93]  T. Schelling The Strategy of Conflict , 1963 .

[94]  Regina T. Riphahn,et al.  The Employment of Mothers – Recent Developments and their Determinants in East and West Germany , 2012 .

[95]  Charles A. Holt,et al.  Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects , 2002 .

[96]  Klaus Wohlrabe,et al.  Predictive Ability of Business Cycle Indicators Under Test: A Case Study for the Euro Area Industrial Production , 2010 .

[97]  Jean-François Laslier,et al.  Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[98]  Ayala Arad,et al.  Multi-dimensional iterative reasoning in action: The case of the Colonel Blotto game , 2012 .

[99]  Robin Hanson,et al.  Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction Market Observers , 2008 .

[100]  Glenn Ellison,et al.  How Does the Market Use Citation Data? The Hirsch Index in Economics , 2010, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[101]  Balázs Szentes,et al.  Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games , 2003, Games Econ. Behav..

[102]  Sergiu Hart,et al.  Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games , 2008, Int. J. Game Theory.

[103]  Brian Roberson,et al.  Pork-Barrel Politics, Targetable Policies, and Fiscal Federalism , 2008 .

[104]  Tilman Klumpp,et al.  Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect , 2006 .