On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule

Median Voting Rule (MVR) has been proposed as a voting rule,based on the argument that MVR will be less manipulable thanBorda Rule. We find that plurality rule has only a slightlygreater probability of manipulability than MVR, and thatCopeland Rule has a smaller probability of manipulability thanMVR. In addition Borda Rule, plurality rule and Copeland Ruleall have both a greater probability of producing a decisiveresult and a greater strict Condorcet efficiency than MVR.Based on all characteristics, MVR does not seem to be viablereplacement for either plurality rule or for Copeland Rule.

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