论文信息 - Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities

Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities

We study Bayesian mechanism design in the context of the siting of noxious facilities. Under incomplete information, we characterize optimal mechanisms facilitating the siting and cost sharing of the facility. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of the incentive notion to Bayesian–Nash equilibrium and to the balanced budget condition. This phenomenon disappears if the setting is perfectly symmetric.

Denis Lescop | Denis Lescop

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