India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program

1 On May 11 and 13, 1998, India set off five nuclear devices at its test site in Pokhran in the northwestern Indian state of Rajasthan-its first such tests in twenty-four years. The initial test had been carried out at the same site on May 18, 1974. Not unexpectedly, as in 1974 much of the world community, including the majority of the great powers, unequivocally condemned the Indian tests.’ The coalition national government, dominated by the jingoistic Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), knew that significant international pressures would be brought to bear upon India once it breached this important threshold. Yet the BJP chose to disregard the likely adverse consequences and departed from India’s post1974 ”nuclear option” policy, which had reserved for India the right to weaponize its nuclear capabilities but had not overtly declared its weapons capability. National governments of varying political persuasions had adhered to this strategy for more than two decades. A number of seemingly compelling possibilities have been offered to explain India’s dramatic departure from its policy of nuclear restraint. None, however, constitutes a complete explanation. Yet each offers useful insights into the forces that led to the Indian nuclear tests. One explanation holds that the chauvinistic BJP-led government conducted the tests to demonstrate both its own virility to the Indian populace and India’s military prowess to the rest of the world. A second argument suggests that the BJP conducted the tests to cement its links with contentious parliamentary allies. A third argument con

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