论文信息 - Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy

Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy

Abstract We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a dominant strategy solution in the interior of the strategy space. We observe significant over-contribution. Our result is similar to those of typical corner-solution experiments.

Claudia Keser | C. Keser

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