Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains

The design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization. Hence, it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices. A precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players' expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one's own favor (Schelling, 1960). How these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

[1]  Ralph A. Winter,et al.  An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints , 1984 .

[2]  Y Joseph Lin,et al.  The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing , 1990 .

[3]  P. T. Spiller,et al.  Strategyand Transaction Costs: The Organizationofdistributioninthecarbonatedsoftdrinkindustry , 1992 .

[4]  C. Fershtman,et al.  Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly , 1984 .

[5]  G. Shaffer,et al.  On the dampening-of-competition effect of exclusive dealing , 1993 .

[6]  D. Fudenberg,et al.  The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look , 1984 .

[7]  Y. Lin.  Oligopoly and Vertical Integration: Note , 1988 .

[8]  M. Waterson,et al.  Exclusive Trading Contracts in Successive Differentiated Duopoly , 1996 .

[9]  J. Geanakoplos,et al.  Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements , 1985, Journal of Political Economy.

[10]  P. Picard,et al.  COMPETING VERTICAL STRUCTURES: PRECOMMITMENT AND RENEGOTIATION , 1995 .

[11]  Giacomo Bonanno,et al.  Limited knowledge of demand and oligopoly equilibria , 1985 .

[12]  G. Shaffer.  Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices , 1991 .

[13]  Esther Gal-Or,et al.  Duopolistic vertical restraints , 1991 .

[14]  C. Fershtman,et al.  Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation , 1991 .

[15]  M. Waterson.  VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS , 1993 .

[16]  B. Caillaud,et al.  Strategic Aspects of Delegation , 1995 .

[17]  Mathias Dewatripont,et al.  Commitment Through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Third Parties , 1988 .

[18]  M. Katz.  Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments , 1991 .

[19]  J. Spengler.  Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy , 1950, Journal of Political Economy.

[20]  J. Tirole,et al.  The logic of vertical restraints , 1985 .

[21]  Exclusive Dealing Contracts in a Successive Duopoly with Side Payments , 1992 .

[22]  T. Schelling,et al.  The Strategy of Conflict. , 1961 .

[23]  Andrea Shepard,et al.  CONTRACTUAL FORM, RETAIL PRICE, AND ASSET CHARACTERISTICS IN GASOLINE RETAILING. , 1993 .

[24]  Kathryn Graddy,et al.  Do Fast-Food Chains Price Discriminate on the Race and Income Characteristics of an Area? , 1997 .

[25]  M. Slade,et al.  Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice , 2003 .

[26]  O. Williamson.  The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations , 1971 .