Computing Shapley's saddles
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Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are playing an ever increasing role in the study of systems of autonomous agents. A common criticism of Nash equilibrium is that its existence relies on the possibility of randomizing over actions, which in many cases is deemed unsuitable, impractical, or even infeasible.
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