论文信息 - Incomplete contracts and privatization

Incomplete contracts and privatization

The paper offers a selective survey on the incomplete contracts approach to privatization. Furthermore, a simple model of privatization to an owner-manager is developed in which different allocations of ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm which in turn affect allocative and productive efficiency. In this model, privatization is a commitment device of the government to credibly reward the manager for a successful cost reduction and to harden his budget constraint.

Klaus M. Schmidt

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