Forward-looking behavior in Hawk-Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence

We conduct an experiment in continuous time: every subject can change her links to others and her action in a Hawk–Dove game, which she plays bilaterally with each of her linked partners, at any time. We hypothesize that norms exist regarding who establishes and thus pays for links, and that players take these norms into account when deciding on their strategy. For such limitedly forward-looking players who consider othersʼ linking reactions we introduce a strategy adaptation rule (Anticipatory Better-Reply Rule, ABR) and a related stability criterion (Reaction-Anticipatingly Stable, RAS). Our data support our assumption on linking reactions. Subjects seem to take these reactions into account when deciding to switch from Hawk to Dove (ABR-behavior). However, better-reply behavior is prevalent when short-term profits allure. RAS configurations occur more often than Nash equilibria of the base game; however, with respect to stability they perform similar.

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