Do documentation requirements reduce intrinsic motivation and increase worker absence

Command systems are widely used to monitor and control public service provision, but little is known about the effects on individual workers’ motivation and behavior. Using insights from motivation crowding theory, we measure how Danish nursery assistants and social and health care workers (n=981) perceive documentation requirements, and we analyze how this perception relates to intrinsic motivation and worker absence (as reported in official registers). We find that individuals who perceive documentation requirements to be controlling have lower intrinsic motivation and higher absence reported as being due to sickness. This implies that public managers should try to avoid that documentation requirements and other command systems are seen as controlling.

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