Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games
暂无分享,去创建一个
Quanyan Zhu | Yezekael Hayel | David Starobinski | Eran Simhon | Quanyan Zhu | Y. Hayel | D. Starobinski | Eran Simhon
[1] Yang Li,et al. Efficient Ignorance: Information Heterogeneity in a Queue , 2016 .
[2] G. F. Newell,et al. Introduction to the Theory of Queues. , 1963 .
[3] Refael Hassin,et al. Equilibrium in a two dimensional queueing game: When inspecting the queue is costly , 2011 .
[4] Refael Hassin. Consumer Information in Markets with Random Product Quality: The Case of Queues and Balking , 1986 .
[5] D. K. Hildebrand,et al. Congestion Tolls for Poisson Queuing Processes , 1975 .
[6] Refael Hassin,et al. To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems , 2002 .
[7] Amnon Rapoport,et al. Batch Queues with Choice of Arrivals: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Study , 2004 .
[8] J. K. Hunter,et al. Measure Theory , 2007 .
[9] Vincent A. Knight,et al. Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behavior , 2013, Eur. J. Oper. Res..
[10] Zeynep Akşin,et al. The Modern Call Center: A Multi‐Disciplinary Perspective on Operations Management Research , 2007 .
[11] Jeremy H. Large,et al. Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium via Ergodicity , 2012 .
[12] P. Naor. The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls , 1969 .