The catastrophes and the combined failure of institutions, part II : a comparison of Fukushima and Minamata

This paper will attempt to understand how institutional failure should be detected and remedied quickly to limit the extent of damage caused by catastrophes, focusing on two significant cases in Japan: Fukushima and Minamata. Such a damage can be a manifestation of the combined failure. Also, as the causes of the cases relate to social technologies as well as physical technologies, it is necessary to adopt a trans-disciplinary approach which makes it possible to mobilize different capabilities of social and natural scientists, practitioners, and policymakers.

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