An Excess-Based Economic Model for Resource Allocation in Peer-to-Peer Networks

This paper describes economic aspects of gnunet, a peer-topeer framework for anonymous distributed file-sharing. gnunet is decentralized; all nodes are equal peers. In particular, there are no trusted entities in the network. This paper describes an economic model to perform resource allocation and defend against malicious participants in this context. The approach presented does not use credentials or payments; rather, it is based on trust. The design is much like that of a cooperative game in which peers take the role of players. Nodes must cooperate to achieve individual goals. In such a scenario, it is important to be able to distinguish between nodes exhibiting friendly behavior and those exhibiting malicious behavior. gnunet aims to provide anonymity for its users. Its design makes it hard to link a transaction to the node where it originated from. While anonymity requirements make a global view of the end-points of a transaction infeasible, the local link-to-link messages can be fully authenticated. Our economic model is based entirely on this local view of the network and takes only local decisions.

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