Between Cash, Deposit and Bitcoin: Would We Like a Central Bank Digital Currency? Money Demand and Experimental Economics

The aim of this paper is to analyse the demand of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). Using a financial portfolio approach and assuming that individual preferences and policy votes are consistent, we identify the drivers of the political consensus in favour or against such as new currency. Given three different properties of a currency – where the first two are the standard functions of medium of exchange and store of value and the third one is the less explored function of store of information – and three different existing moneys – paper currency, banking currency and cryptocurrency – if the individuals are rational but at the same time can be affected by behavioural biases – loss aversion - three different groups of individuals – respectively lovers, neutrals and haters – emerge respect to the CBDC option. Given the alternative opportunity costs of the different currencies, the CBDC issuing is more likely to occur the more the individuals likes to use a legal tender, and/or are indifferent respect to anonymity; at the same time, the probability of the CBDC introduction increases if a return can be paid on it, and/or its implementation can guarantee at least the counterparty anonymity.

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