Dynamic aspiration based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Gam

Prisoner's dilemma game is the most commonly used model of spatial evolutionary game which is considered as a paradigm to portray competition among selfish individuals. In recent years, Win-Stay-Lose-Learn, a strategy updating rule base on aspiration, has been proved to be an effective model to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game, which leads aspiration to receive lots of attention. In this paper, according to Expected Value Theory and Achievement Motivation Theory, we propose a dynamic aspiration model based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in which individual's aspiration is inspired by its payoff. It is found that dynamic aspiration has a significant impact on the evolution process, and different initial aspirations lead to different results, which are called Stable Coexistence under Low Aspiration, Dependent Coexistence under Moderate aspiration and Defection Explosion under High Aspiration respectively. Furthermore, a deep analysis is performed on the local structures which cause defectors' re-expansion, the concept of END- and EXP-periods are used to justify the mechanism of network reciprocity in view of time-evolution, typical feature nodes for defectors' re-expansion called Infectors, Infected nodes and High-risk cooperators respectively are found. Compared to fixed aspiration model, dynamic aspiration introduces a more satisfactory explanation on population evolution laws and can promote deeper comprehension for the principle of prisoner's dilemma.

[1]  J M Smith,et al.  Evolution and the theory of games , 1976 .

[2]  R. Axelrod Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma , 1980 .

[3]  R. Axelrod More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma , 1980 .

[4]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[5]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Game theory - Analysis of Conflict , 1991 .

[6]  M. Nowak,et al.  Evolutionary games and spatial chaos , 1992, Nature.

[7]  Josef Hofbauer,et al.  Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics , 1998 .

[8]  G. Szabó,et al.  Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice , 1997, cond-mat/9710096.

[9]  K. Sigmund,et al.  The efficiency of adapting aspiration levels , 1998, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences.

[10]  M. Posch,et al.  Win-stay, lose-shift strategies for repeated games-memory length, aspiration levels and noise. , 1999, Journal of theoretical biology.

[11]  Robert Axelrod,et al.  The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma , 2001 .

[12]  Richard Schuster,et al.  Why cooperate? An economic perspective is not enough , 2004, Behavioural Processes.

[13]  G. Szabó,et al.  Phase diagrams for an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices. , 2005, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[14]  H. Fort,et al.  Spatial patterns and scale freedom in Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata with Pavlovian strategies , 2005 .

[15]  M. Nowak,et al.  Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates. , 2006, Theoretical population biology.

[16]  M. Nowak Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation , 2006, Science.

[17]  William H. Sandholm Ross Cressman, Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2003) , 2006 .

[18]  M. Perc Coherence resonance in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game , 2006 .

[19]  Jun Tanimoto,et al.  Relationship between dilemma occurrence and the existence of a weakly dominant strategy in a two-player symmetric game , 2007, Biosyst..

[20]  G. Szabó,et al.  Cooperation enhanced by inhomogeneous activity of teaching for evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games , 2006, q-bio/0610001.

[21]  Hawaii,et al.  Supporting Online Material Materials and Methods Figs. S1 to S6 Tables S1 and S2 Database S1 Antisocial Punishment across Societies , 2022 .

[22]  Wenjian Yu,et al.  Migration as a Mechanism to Promote Cooperation , 2008, Adv. Complex Syst..

[23]  M. Perc,et al.  Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation , 2008, 0803.4091.

[24]  G. Szabó,et al.  Cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma with two types of players for increasing number of neighbors. , 2008, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[25]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game , 2010, 1007.0431.

[26]  Zhihai Rong,et al.  Effects of aspiration on public cooperation in structured populations , 2012 .

[27]  Long Wang,et al.  Evolution of Cooperation Driven by Reputation-Based Migration , 2012, PloS one.

[28]  Long Wang,et al.  Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game , 2012, PloS one.

[29]  Hiroki Sayama,et al.  Adaptive long-range migration promotes cooperation under tempting conditions , 2013, Scientific Reports.

[30]  S. Kokubo,et al.  Insight into the so-called spatial reciprocity. , 2013, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[31]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Coexistence of fraternity and egoism for spatial social dilemmas. , 2013, Journal of theoretical biology.

[32]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment , 2014, ArXiv.

[33]  Aya Hagishima,et al.  Effect of a large gaming neighborhood and a strategy adaptation neighborhood for bolstering network reciprocity in a prisoner's dilemma game , 2014 .

[34]  S. Kokubo,et al.  Universal scaling for the dilemma strength in evolutionary games. , 2015, Physics of life reviews.

[35]  Jun Tanimoto,et al.  Fundamentals of Evolutionary Game Theory and its Applications , 2015 .

[36]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Conformity enhances network reciprocity in evolutionary social dilemmas , 2014, Journal of The Royal Society Interface.

[37]  Xiaojie Chen,et al.  First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation , 2015, Journal of The Royal Society Interface.

[38]  Matjaž Perc,et al.  Stochastic win-stay-lose-shift strategy with dynamic aspirations in evolutionary social dilemmas. , 2016, Physical review. E.

[39]  Kevin Fiedler,et al.  A Theory Of Achievement Motivation , 2016 .

[40]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas , 2016, Scientific Reports.

[41]  Chen Chu,et al.  Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game with voluntary participation , 2017, PloS one.

[42]  Han-Xin Yang,et al.  Stochastic win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial public goods game , 2018 .

[43]  Long Wang,et al.  Coevolutionary dynamics of aspiration and strategy in spatial repeated public goods games , 2018, New Journal of Physics.

[44]  M. Perc,et al.  Aspiration-based coevolution of link weight promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game , 2018, Royal Society Open Science.

[45]  Jun Tanimoto,et al.  Evolutionary Games with Sociophysics: Analysis of Traffic Flow and Epidemics , 2018 .

[46]  Jun Tanimoto,et al.  Influence of bolstering network reciprocity in the evolutionary spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game: a perspective , 2018, The European Physical Journal B.

[47]  Jun Tanimoto,et al.  Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation , 2018, Royal Society Open Science.

[48]  Changwei Huang,et al.  Aspiration-dependent strategy persistence promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game , 2019, EPL (Europhysics Letters).

[49]  S. Boccaletti,et al.  Aspiration-based coevolution of node weights promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game , 2019, New Journal of Physics.

[50]  Md. Rajib Arefin,et al.  Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas under the coexistence of aspiration and imitation mechanisms. , 2020, Physical review. E.

[51]  J. Tanimoto,et al.  Dynamic utility: the sixth reciprocity mechanism for the evolution of cooperation , 2020, Royal Society Open Science.

[52]  Md. Rajib Arefin,et al.  Social efficiency deficit deciphers social dilemmas , 2020, Scientific Reports.