To Make or to Sell? The Case of In-House Outsourcing at Fiat Auto

In-house outsourcing is a major organizational innovation built on a combination of under-the-same-roof outsourcing, interdependent outsourcing and continual incomplete re-contracting. Its introduction has great impact on the production flow, organization of work, job content, and problems in everyday interactions. In-depth analysis of the Fiat Auto case sheds new light on this emerging innovation, showing in particular that relationships between the market and organizational interactions (formal and informal) vary according to the type of outsourcing. The paper also outlines a typology of the outsourced activities (sequential versus interdependent crossed with low versus high complexity).

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