The Generalized Means Model (GMM) for non-deterministic decision making: Its normative and descriptive power, including sketch of the representation theorem

Two schools of thought have been arguing during the last thirty years about the foundations of the theory of choice under uncertainty, namely: The neo-Bernoullian or American school defending an Expected Utility Model (EUM); and the Allais or French school proposing a model based on the moments of the probability distribution over psychological values (MM).In this paper we present a unified theory: the Generalized Means Model (GMM). By using the well known concept of the generalized mean it is possible to derive both contesting models from the same core of axioms, that — surprisingly enough — includes an extended form of the hotly debated Substitution Principle.It can be seen that the differences between the two models occur at the beginning and at the end of their axiomatic derivation, as follows: the EUM starts from a probability distribution function over consequences whereas the MM begins with a probability distribution over psychological values. The EUM finishes with an early introduction of a behavioural axiom on the existance of utility, whereas the MM uses first the properties of the distribution function, and then introduces the behavioural assumptions.The simplest MM consistent with all axioms of the GMM is the model proposed by the author some years ago. It is suggested that a reduced version, the Three Moments Model (TMM), is sufficient for practical applications.The second part of the paper demonstrates how the TMM solves in a very natural way the Allais Paradox, the certainty effect, the reflection effect, and several other behavioural observations.

[1]  M. Allais Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque : critique des postulats et axiomes de l'ecole americaine , 1953 .

[2]  A. Tversky,et al.  Who accepts Savage's axiom? , 1974 .

[3]  Howard Raiffa,et al.  Games And Decisions , 1958 .

[4]  C. Coombs,et al.  Testing expectation theories of decision making without measuring utility or subjective probability , 1967 .

[5]  Y. Amihud Critical Examination of the New Foundation of Utility , 1974 .

[6]  A. Tversky Additivity, utility, and subjective probability , 1967 .

[7]  R. L. Keeney,et al.  Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Trade-Offs , 1977, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics.

[8]  J. Shohat,et al.  The problem of moments , 1943 .

[9]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: analysis of decision under risk , 1979 .

[10]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision under Risk Author ( s ) : , 2007 .

[11]  L. J. Savage,et al.  The Foundations of Statistics , 1955 .

[12]  Gerhard Tintner,et al.  The Theory of Choice Under Subjective Risk and Uncertainty , 1941 .

[13]  David E. Bell,et al.  Regret in Decision Making under Uncertainty , 1982, Oper. Res..

[14]  S. Chew A Generalization of the Quasilinear Mean with Applications to the Measurement of Income Inequality and Decision Theory Resolving the Allais Paradox , 1983 .

[15]  J. Neumann,et al.  Theory of games and economic behavior , 1945, 100 Years of Math Milestones.

[16]  Clyde H. Coombs,et al.  Tests of a portfolio theory of risk preference , 1970 .

[17]  Richard de Neufville,et al.  A Decision Analysis Model When the Substitution Principle is Not Acceptable , 1983 .