Pay-as-bid based reactive power market

In energy market clearing, the offers are stacked in increasing order and the offer that intersects demand curve, determines the market clearing price (MCP). In reactive power market, the location of reactive power compensator is so important. A low cost reactive producer may not essentially be favorable if it is far from the consumer. Likewise, a high cost local reactive compensator at a heavily loaded demand center of network could be inevitably an alternative required to produce reactive power to maintain the integrity of power system. Given the background, this paper presents a day-ahead reactive power market based on pay-as-bid (PAB) mechanism. Generators expected payment function (EPF) is used to construct a bidding framework. Then, total payment function (TPF) of generators is used as the objective function of optimal power flow (OPF) problem to clear the PAB based market. The CIGRE-32 bus test system is used to examine the effectiveness of the proposed reactive power market.

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