Cores of non-atomic market games

We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley (Values of non-atomic games, 1974), and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy et al. (Int J Game Theory 28:1–14, 1999). We show that the core of such games is norm compact and some related results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our findings.

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