Since the 11 September terrorist attacks, the Bush administration has made it abundantly clear that it is not willing to accept the status quo in Iraq. It has vigorously asserted that Saddam Hussein’s continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and his past links to terrorism could make his regime the next target in the “war on terrorism.” At the same time, virtually all Nato allies and every one of America’s regional strategic partners have disagreed with the use of military force either to compel Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions or to topple Saddam’s regime. The result is a growing divergence between the United States and its European allies and Middle Eastern partners at a time when, more than ever, the willing assistance of these states is needed if counterterrorism against al-Qa‘ida is to succeed. Unfortunately, as the rhetoric has grown more heated, pundits on each side have emphasized the dangers of their rivals’ preferred strategy while whitewashing the shortcomings of their own. Hence Americans have increasingly been led to view the Europeans as “free-riders” and to pay little heed to the concerns of Arab states for regional stability. Europeans in turn complain of American unilateralism and hegemonic ambitions, ignoring in the case of Iraq how their own policies have shaped the growing tendency of the United States toward self-reliance. Meanwhile, the Arab governments, whose support for military action against Iraq has been less than enthusiastic since the end of the Gulf War, find their own national agendas increasingly co-opted by popular outrage over the Captain Langenheim is a reserve infantry officer currently on active duty with Marine Forces UNITAS, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. A 1995 graduate of the University of Virginia, he also holds a master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown University. While on active duty, Captain Langenheim’s postings included duty with the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, and Interim Marine Corps Security Force Company, Bahrain.
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