A general hierarchical graph model for conflict resolution with application to greenhouse gas emission disputes between USA and China

The general hierarchical graph model, a significant expansion of the graph model for conflict resolution methodology, is designed to analyze interrelated conflicts with hierarchical structures. In a general hierarchical graph model, there are common decision makers, who take part in all related subconflicts, and local decision makers, who participate in only one subconflict. In this paper, preference structures for decision makers in a hierarchical graph model are established, and theorems are developed that elucidate the relationship between stabilities in the overall (hierarchical) model and stabilities in the component submodels. To illustrate, the hierarchical graph model is applied to greenhouse gas emission disputes between USA and China, where local decision makers in the USA are the two parties in Congress, and local decision makers in China are state-owned energy companies. The stability results suggest potential strategic resolutions of bilateral disputes, and how parties can attain them.

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