Egoism, Parochialism, and Universalism

In the standard n-Prisoners' Dilemma (nPD), defection is generally interpreted as evidence of egoistic or self-interested motives. Cooperation, however, is compatible with (at least) two motives: universalism, a generalized norm that one should restrain one's selfish impulses to benefit humanity, and parochialism, the norm that one owes cooperation to one's “solidarity group.” In contrast to research supporting the parochial explanation of cooperation, this article presents experimental evidence in support of what is called here “discriminating universalism.” Groups of interacting individuals will restrain their parochial tendencies if they perceive the outgroup affected by their choices as worthy of their help. The findings suggest that, for a group of interacting individuals, neither general normative appeals nor individually based material incentives will mitigate parochial choices. Instead, strategies to limit parochialism must directly confront the comparative worthiness of specific groups.

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