The resolution of ambiguity during conversation: More than mere mimicry? Jennifer Roche (jroche@memphis.edu) Rick Dale (radale@memphis.edu) Roger J. Kreuz (rkreuz@memphis.edu) Department of Psychology, 202 Psychology Building Memphis, TN 38152 USA Abstract end. Recent research suggests that this strategy of responding is relatively egocentric. This often occurs because cognitive load is initially reduced at the onset of the conversation, especially when common knowledge has not been fully established (Bard, Anderson, Chen, Nicholson, Harvard, & Dazel-Job, 2007; Rayner, Carlson, & Frayser, 1983; Schober, 1993). Taking an egocentric perspective may eventually become quite cumbersome if the speaker must continually adjust his/her own previous statements when the message is unclear (Levelt, 1989; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). In order to resolve the confusion, interlocutors must perceive the existing ambiguity early on in the conversation. If the existing ambiguity is realized, then there will be no need to restate the message because it will not be misunderstood. Therefore, it is important to investigate how individuals recover during these instances of miscommunication. Haywood, Pickering and Branigan (2004) have demonstrated an effective method in which conversation partners may resolve instances of ambiguity. These authors suggest that syntactic priming is an effective and automatic strategy interlocutors use to communicate effectively with each other (Garrod & Pickering, 2004). They maintain that under certain situations (e.g., giving instructions) conversation partners will initially respond ambiguously unless they are primed to disambiguate. This type of syntactic strategy shows the listener how to correctly clarify his/her statements. Haywood, Pickering, and Branigan have also shown that syntactic priming has a quite substantial effect on future utterances. This is beneficial to the speakers, because s/he realizes how to disambiguate his/her own statements without explicitly being instructed to do so. Priming clearly has a dominant influence in dialogue, but interlocutors rarely implement this strategy on their own (Haywood, Pickering, & Branigan, 2004). It should be considered that the effect of the prime might merely represent the automaticity of aligning at the syntactic level (Garrod & Pickering, 2004; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). This level of alignment could represent conversational mimicry, rather than the understanding of why the speaker is required to disambiguate. Other strategies are possible and it is imperative to evaluate other cues speakers may retroactively use to elucidate confusing situations (Horton & Keysar, 1996). The studies reported here will evaluate the contribution of linguistic and/or non-linguistic behavioral cues to the breakdown in communication. If priming truly represents the mechanism behind disambiguation, then there Interlocutors often omit important words during conversation, which can lead to miscommunication during ambiguous scenarios (Rayner, Carlson, & Frasyer, 1983). Haywood, Pickering and Branigan (2004) show that under ambiguous situations, listeners are highly sensitive to syntactic primes. The studies reported here evaluated the effects of linguistic and nonlinguistic cues to ambiguity. Experiment 1 implemented a syntactic prime and a visual mistake from a pseudo-confederate to promote disambiguation. Participants were successfully primed to disambiguate their statements during the pseudo-conversation but the visual mistake had no effect. Experiment 2 evaluated the effect of the visual mistake in the absence of a prime during an ambiguous pseudo-conversation. There was a significant effect of visual mistake for participants who believed they were speaking with a real person. Overall, participants did not merely mimic their pseudo-conversation partner’s syntactic prime, but perceived other cues to the breakdown in communication to better clarify their own statements. Keywords: Priming; conversation; language; linguistics; nonverbal communication Introduction Verbal and nonverbal communication requires individuals to correctly decode meaning behind an intended message. However, there is a great deal of ambiguity that naturally occurs during conversation. This may occur because individuals are presented with a multitude of information during communication scenarios (i.e., foreground and background information, with an influence from visual, auditory, and motor events). Yet interlocutors have the ability to interpret the intended message with relatively little difficulty (Garrod & Pickering, 2004; Pickering & Garrod, 2004). In fact, miscommunication often occurs (e.g., leaving out a seemingly useless bit of information because it’s utility is not recognized; Guhe & Bard, 2008). Individuals often leave out a single word that could help clarify the intended meaning behind a statement (e.g., “that” to group two objects as one, Haywood, Pickering, & Branigan, 2004). Some researchers have suggested that choices in the use of syntax are influenced by ease of production (Bock, 1986; Branigan, Pickering & Cleland, 2000). This ease in production may help explain why interlocutors often omit information during conversations. Individuals may leave out words because it is initially easier to exclude information when s/he is unsure of what his/her communicative partner already knows (Lee, 2001; Levelt, 1989; Horton & Keysar, 1996). This strategy may save the speaker time in the beginning, but it will be costly in the
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