论文信息 - A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems - 字舞流文

A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems

We propose an elementary game form that allows to obtain the allocations proposed by any acceptable bankruptcy rule as the unique payoff vector of the corresponding Nash equilibria.

A. Villar | I. García-Jurado | J. González-Díaz

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