Understanding, Evaluating and Selecting Voting Rules Through Games and Axioms
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] B. Peleg,et al. A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set , 1984 .
[2] Donald Wittman,et al. Final-Offer Arbitration , 1986 .
[3] M. Remzi Sanver,et al. Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners , 2003, Soc. Choice Welf..
[4] Murat R. Sertel,et al. Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners , 2004, Soc. Choice Welf..
[5] Steven J. Brams,et al. Equilibrium strategies for final-offer arbitration: there is no median convergence , 1983 .
[6] B. Peleg. Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees , 1984 .
[7] D. Rae,et al. Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice , 1969, American Political Science Review.
[8] Arunava Sen,et al. Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences , 2001, J. Econ. Theory.
[9] J. Guttman. Unanimity and majority rule: the calculus of consent reconsidered* , 1998 .
[10] D. Black. The theory of committees and elections , 1959 .
[11] Ming-Deh A. Huang,et al. Proof of proposition 2 , 1992 .
[12] H. Keiding,et al. Effectivity functions in social choice , 1991 .
[13] A Artyszak,et al. P i K , 2003 .
[14] Ben L. Erdreich,et al. The Rule of Three in Federal Hiring: Boon or Bane? , 1995 .
[15] Alvin E. Roth,et al. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis , 1990 .
[16] Kalyan Chatterjee. Comparison of Arbitration Procedures: Models with Complete and Incomplete Information , 1981, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics.
[17] K. Taira. Proof of Theorem 1.3 , 2004 .
[18] D. Mueller. Public choice II , 1989 .
[19] Salvador Barberà,et al. Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica Barcelona Economics Working Paper Series Working Paper n o 57 Choosing How to Choose : Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions , 2004 .
[20] Roger Sherman,et al. Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible With Bargaining , 1968 .
[21] Social Decision Rules Are Not Immune to Conflict , 2001 .
[22] Vincent P. Crawford,et al. Arbitration and Conflict Resolution in Labor-Management Bargaining , 1981 .
[23] Peter C. Fishburn,et al. An analysis of simple voting systems for electing committees , 1980 .
[24] Leonard M. Adleman,et al. Proof of proposition 3 , 1992 .
[25] Peter C. Fishburn,et al. Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice , 1984 .
[26] Agreement and efficiency: response to Guttman , 1998 .
[27] S. Shapiro,et al. Mathematics without Numbers , 1993 .
[28] Salvador Barberà,et al. Voting by Committees , 1991 .
[29] William V. Gehrlein,et al. The Condorcet criterion and committee selection , 1985 .
[30] W. Bossert,et al. Ranking Sets of Objects , 2001 .
[31] Thomas C. Ratliff. Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees , 2003, Soc. Choice Welf..
[32] Henry S. Farber,et al. An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration , 1980 .
[33] K. Arrow. The external costs of voting rules: a note on Guttman, Buchanan, and Tullock , 1998 .
[34] H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making , 1988 .
[35] Salvador Barberà,et al. Self-Selection Consistent Functions , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.
[36] Geoffrey Brennan,et al. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. , 1987 .
[37] Kenneth J. Arrow,et al. Frontiers of Economics , 1987 .