Signed Graph Games: Coalitional Games with Friends, Enemies and Allies

The ability to cooperate is one of the key features of many multiagent systems. In this paper, we extend the well-known model of graph-restricted games due to Myerson to signed graphs, where the link between any two players may be either positive or negative. Hence, in our model, it is possible to explicitly define not only that some players are friends (as in Myerson’s model) but also that some other players are enemies. As such our games can express a wider range of situations, e.g., animosities between political parties. We say that a coalition is feasible if every two players are connected by a path of positive edges and no two players are connected by a negative edge. We define the value for signed graph games using the axiomatic approach that closely follows the celebrated characterisation of the Myerson value. Furthermore, we propose an algorithm for computing an arbitrary semivalue, including the one proposed by us. Moreover, we consider signed graph games with a priori defined alliances (unions) between players and propose an algorithm for the extension of the Owen value to this setting.

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