Tractor Beam

The consumer drone market is booming. Consumer drones are predominantly used for aerial photography; however, their use has been expanding because of their autopilot technology. Unfortunately, terrorists have also begun to use consumer drones for kamikaze bombing and reconnaissance. To protect against such threats, several companies have started “anti-drone” services that primarily focus on disrupting or incapacitating drone operations. However, the approaches employed are inadequate, because they make any drone that has intruded stop and remain over the protected area. We specify this issue by introducing the concept of safe-hijacking, which enables a hijacker to expel the intruding drone from the protected area remotely. As a safe-hijacking strategy, we investigated whether consumer drones in the autopilot mode can be hijacked via adaptive GPS spoofing. Specifically, as consumer drones activate GPS fail-safe and change their flight mode whenever a GPS error occurs, we performed black- and white-box analyses of GPS fail-safe flight mode and the following behavior after GPS signal recovery of existing consumer drones. Based on our analyses results, we developed a taxonomy of consumer drones according to these fail-safe mechanisms and designed safe-hijacking strategies for each drone type. Subsequently, we applied these strategies to four popular drones: DJI Phantom 3 Standard, DJI Phantom 4, Parrot Bebop 2, and 3DR Solo. The results of field experiments and software simulations verified the efficacy of our safe-hijacking strategies against these drones and demonstrated that the strategies can force them to move in any direction with high accuracy.

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