论文信息 - Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments - 字舞流文

Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments

In this note we prove a McGarvey theorem for the family of Separable Tournaments. This family arises in the analysis of Logrolling and Vote Trading in Committees.

Michel Le Breton | Guillaume Hollard | M. Breton | Guillaume Hollard

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