Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology

Introduction and overview the fundamental assumptions of classical cognitive science: classical cognitive science - representations and rules, Marr's framework for classical cognitive science and the basic assumptions of classicism what we deny, and what we don't what is wrong with classical cognitive science: Descartes - reason is a universal instrument, the potential relevance of anything to anything, Fodor's critique of classical cognitive science cognitive systems as dynamical systems - a nonclassical framework for cognitive science: a general framework for cognitive science, connectionist networks and dynamical systems, deviations from classicism, the alternative framework - noncomputable dynamical cognition, conceptions of mind - a short recapitulation why there still has to be a language of thought, and what that means: syntax and mental representations, the tracking argument, physical skills are not dispositions to respond, comparison with other arguments for syntax, deductive reasoning mental causation without rules: defeasible causal tendencies, cognitive forces, cognition is not computation standard-conception laws and soft laws: the standard conception of laws, soft laws soft laws and psychological explanation: confirmability of ceteris paribus generalizations, soft laws and psychological explanation, some philosophical implications noncomputable dynamical cognition: intrinsic vs. dispositional realisation of structure, cognitive forces and dynamical cognition, appropriating some classicist principles of cognitive design, adapting some connectionist principles of cognitive design, disclaimers.