From Secrecy to Authenticity in Security Protocols

We present a new technique for verifying authenticity in cryptographic protocols. This technique is fully automatic, it can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol, and it is efficient in practice. It significantly extends a previous technique for the verification of secrecy. The protocol is represented in an extension of the pi calculus with fairly arbitrary cryptographic primitives. This protocol representation includes the authentication specification to be verified, but no other annotation. Our technique has been proved correct, implemented, and tested on various protocols from the literature. The experimental results show that we can verify these protocols in less than 1 s.

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