论文信息 - The stable admissions polytope

The stable admissions polytope

Abstract.The stable admissions polytope– the convex hull of the stable assignments of the university admissions problem – is described by a set of linear inequalities. It depends on a new characterization of stability and arguments that exploit and extend a graphical approach that has been fruitful in the analysis of the stable marriage problem.

Michel Balinski | Mourad Baïou | M. Balinski | Mourad Baïou

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