Formal verification of ACAS X, an industrial airborne collision avoidance system

Formal verification of industrial systems is very challenging, due to reasons ranging from scalability issues to communication difficulties with engineering-focused teams. More importantly, industrial systems are rarely designed for verification, but rather for operational needs. In this paper we present an overview of our experience using hybrid systems theorem proving to formally verify ACAS X, an airborne collision avoidance system for airliners scheduled to be operational around 2020. The methods and proof techniques presented here are an overview of the work already presented in [8], while the evaluation of ACAS X has been significantly expanded and updated to the most recent version of the system, run 13. The effort presented in this paper is an integral part of the ACAS X development and was performed in tight collaboration with the ACAS X development team.

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