Sequentially simulated outcomes: kind experience versus nontransparent description.

Recently, researchers have investigated differences in decision making based on description and experience. We address the issue of when experience-based judgments of probability are more accurate than are those based on description. If description is well understood ("transparent") and experience is misleading ("wicked"), it is preferable to experience. However, if description is not transparent, will valid ("kind") experience lead to more accurate judgments? We report 2 experiments. The first involved 7 well-known probabilistic inference tasks. Participants differed in statistical sophistication and answered with and without experience obtained through sequentially simulated outcomes. The second experiment involved interpreting the outcomes of a regression analysis when making inferences for investment decisions. In both experiments, even the statistically naïve achieved accurate probabilistic inferences after experiencing sequentially simulated outcomes, and many preferred this presentation format. We conclude by discussing theoretical and practical implications.

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