Fiscal discipline and the choice of a nominal anchor in stabilization

Abstract The conventional wisdom is that exchange rate-based stabilizations induce more fiscal discipline than money-based programs. The Latin American experience does not support this view. Among the major stabilization programs implemented since 1960, the mean increase in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio was 3.2 percentage points under money-based programs, as opposed to only 0.2 percentage points under exchange rate-based programs. We present a model – where fiscal policy is set by an optimizing but non-benevolent government – that replicates this stylized fact. If the policy maker is impatient, a money-based stabilization provides more discipline, and higher welfare for the representative agent, than does an exchange rate-based stabilization.

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