Continuous implementation in economics with incomplete information

[1]  J. Harsanyi.  Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points , 1968 .

[2]  J. Harsanyi.  Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game , 1968 .

[3]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[4]  W. Hildenbrand.  Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy. , 1974 .

[5]  L. Hurwicz.  Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes , 1977 .

[6]  Martin P. Loeb,et al.  Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm , 1979 .

[7]  Revelation and Implementation under Differential Information , 1984 .

[8]  Implementation Theory in Economies with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[9]  Andrew Postlewaite,et al.  Implementation in differential information economies , 1986 .

[10]  Thomas R. Palfrey,et al.  On Bayesian Implementable Allocations , 1987 .

[11]  John. Moore,et al.  Subgame Perfect Implementation , 1988 .

[12]  Andrew Postlewaite,et al.  Feasible and Continuous Implementation , 1989 .

[13]  T. Palfrey,et al.  Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies , 1989 .

[14]  David Wettstein.  Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria , 1990 .

[15]  David Easley,et al.  Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria , 1990 .

[16]  Thomas R. Palfrey,et al.  Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies , 1991 .