Shipping the good apples out: a note on contributions of time and money

This note applies insights from a famous problem in price theory, "Shipping the Good Apples Out," to expand the comparative static predictions of the model of monetary donations and volunteering developed by Andreoni, Gale and Scotz (1996). we show that the Hicksian supply of volunteering may be an increasing function of the wage, if volunteering is strongly complementary to either donations or consumption. It is also possible for government charity to crowd-in private contributions.

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