Unlike the paradoxicality of the strengthened Liar sentence, the paradoxicality of this infinite list of ‘Yablo sentences’ is not at all straightforward. In Ketland (forthcoming), it is shown that the list of Yablo sentences is not formally inconsistent. More precisely, the list of ‘Yablo biconditionals’ (all instances of ‘Yn "m > n, Ym is not true’) is not inconsistent with the relevant local disquotation principle (all instances of ‘Yn is true Yn’). Rather, the combination is w-inconsistent. Furthermore, with an appropriate definition of the extension of ‘true’, it is possible to satisfy this combination on any non-standard model of arithmetic.1 So, in a sense, Yablo’s paradox is not a genuine paradox. Rather, it is an ‘w-paradox’, an infinite set of sentences which is unsatisfiable on the standard model of arithmetic.
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