The Non-Existence of the Real World

The book is concerned with the existence of the real world, that is, with the existence of a world of objects that exist independent of human interests, concerns, and cognitive activities. The main thesis defended is that we have good reason to deny the existence of such a world. The discussion is concerned with four main facets of assuming a real world: (a) the existence of an external world of physical objects in space and time; (b) the existence of an internal world, comprising various mental states congregated around a self; (c) the existence of an ontological foundation that grounds the existence of all the entities in the world; and (d) the existence of an ultimately true theory that provides a final account of all there is. I argue specifically that: (a) we should reject the postulation of an external world behind our representations; (b) the internal world is not as epistemically transparent as is usually assumed, and there is no substantial self acting as central unifier of our mental lives; (c) there are good reasons for adopting an anti-foundational account of ontological dependence; and (d) ontology, and philosophy more generally, must not be conceived of as providing an ultimately true theory of the world.