Temporal synchrony, dynamic bindings, and Shruti: A representational but nonclassical model of reflexive reasoning

Abstract Lange & Dyer misunderstand what is meant by an “entity” and confuse a medium of representation (synchrony) with the content being represented. This leads them to the erroneous conclusion that SHRUTI will run out of phases and that its representation of bindings lacks semantic content. It is argued that (1) the limit on the number of phases suffices, and (2) SHRUTI can be interpreted as using “dynamic signatures” that offer significant advantages over fixed preexisting signatures. Bonatti refers to three levels of commitment to a representational theory of the mind (RTM) and states that SHRUTI is committed to RTM at levels 1 and 2. He acknowledges that SHRUTI is not committed at level 3, but argues that an extended SHRUTI would have to make such a commitment. We agree that SHRUTI is committed to RTM at level 1 and, in a sense, also at level 2. SHRUTI, however, is not committed to RTM at level 3 and, even though it has been extended in several ways, it has retained its original representational character.

[1]  Michael G. Dyer,et al.  High-level Inferencing in a Connectionist Network , 1989 .

[2]  Garrison W. Cottrell,et al.  From symbols to neurons: Are we there yet? , 1993, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[3]  Brian J. Reiser,et al.  Some Empirical Justification for a Theory of Natural Propositional Logic , 1984 .

[4]  Risto Miikkulainen,et al.  Natural Language Processing With Modular PDP Networks and Distributed Lexicon , 1991, Cogn. Sci..

[5]  J. Fodor,et al.  The Language of Thought , 1980 .

[6]  M. Just,et al.  Individual differences in syntactic processing: The role of working memory , 1991 .

[7]  Ron Sun,et al.  Computational Architectures Integrating Neural And Symbolic Processes , 1994 .

[8]  L. Shastri,et al.  From simple associations to systematic reasoning: A connectionist representation of rules, variables and dynamic bindings using temporal synchrony , 1993, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[9]  Mark F. St. John,et al.  The Story Gestalt: A Model of Knowledge-Intensive Processes in Text Comprehension , 1992, Cogn. Sci..

[10]  James L. McClelland,et al.  Parallel distributed processing: explorations in the microstructure of cognition, vol. 1: foundations , 1986 .

[11]  M. Braine,et al.  A Theory of If: A Lexical Entry, Reasoning Program, and Pragmatic Principles , 1991 .

[12]  Istvan S. N. Berkeley,et al.  Making a middling mousetrap , 1993, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[13]  Jeffrey D. Ullman,et al.  Parallel complexity of logical query programs , 1986, 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1986).

[14]  James Henderson,et al.  Connectionist syntactic parsing using temporal variable binding , 1994 .

[15]  Ron Sun,et al.  Robust Reasoning: Integrating Rule-Based and Similarity-Based Reasoning , 1995, Artif. Intell..

[16]  Trent E. Lange.  Lexical and Pragmatic Disambiguation and Re-Interpretation in Connectionist Networks , 1992, Int. J. Man Mach. Stud..

[17]  P. Carpenter,et al.  Individual differences in working memory and reading , 1980 .

[18]  W. Freeman.  Second Commentary: On the proper treatment of connectionism by Paul Smolensky (1988) - Neuromachismo Rekindled , 1989 .

[19]  Geoffrey E. Hinton,et al.  Parallel Models of Associative Memory , 1989 .

[20]  James Alexander Hendler,et al.  integrating Marker Passing and Problem Solving: A Spreading Activation Approach To Improved Choice in Planning , 1987 .

[21]  S. Pinker,et al.  Connections and symbols , 1988 .

[22]  Paul Smolensky,et al.  Tensor Product Variable Binding and the Representation of Symbolic Structures in Connectionist Systems , 1990, Artif. Intell..

[23]  Christopher K. Riesbeck,et al.  Experience, Memory and Reasoning , 1986 .

[24]  Jerome A. Feldman,et al.  Connectionist Models and Their Properties , 1982, Cogn. Sci..

[25]  M. Just,et al.  From the SelectedWorks of Marcel Adam Just 1992 A capacity theory of comprehension : Individual differences in working memory , 2017 .

[26]  M. Velmans.  Is human information processing conscious? , 1991, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[27]  W. Bechtel,et al.  Connectionism and the Mind , 1991 .

[28]  P. Smolensky.  On the proper treatment of connectionism , 1988, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[29]  M. Just,et al.  Working memory constraints on the processing of syntactic ambiguity , 1992, Cognitive Psychology.

[30]  P. Johnson-Laird,et al.  Propositional reasoning by model. , 1992, Psychological review.

[31]  M. Oaksford,et al.  Computational and biological constraints in the psychology of reasoning , 1993, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[32]  Geoffrey E. Hinton,et al.  A Distributed Connectionist Production System , 1988, Cogn. Sci..

[33]  Scott E. Fahlman,et al.  NETL: A System for Representing and Using Real-World Knowledge , 1979, CL.

[34]  G. A. Miller.  THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW THE MAGICAL NUMBER SEVEN, PLUS OR MINUS TWO: SOME LIMITS ON OUR CAPACITY FOR PROCESSING INFORMATION 1 , 1956 .